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This thesis takes a detailed look at the activity of the House Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee in the area of Defense Procurement for
the period, FY 1970-1973. By analyzing House Reports and records of
hearings, the reasons for the Subcommittee budgetary actions are iden-
tified and cataloged so as to determine true Subcommittee initiative.
For the period considered, three aspects of Subcommittee activity are
identified which contribute to a greater insight into Congressional
budgetary behavior. First, the authorization process is shown to have
had an increasing impact on the Defense Procurement Appropriation;
second, it is shown that less than 40 per cent of all Subcommittee
recommendations are the result of true Subcommittee initiative; and
third, the Navy has been the Service most affected both in number of
decisions and dollar amount of reduction. With regard to the fiscal
versus programmatic controversy, it is suggested that Subcommittee
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I. INTRODUCTION
Congressional scrutiny of the Defense Budget continues to increase.
Public awareness of the Federal Budget remains heavily centered on the
well-publicized Defense request as pressures grow for the reduced
requirements expected of peacetime and for an accompanying shift of
priorities toward the non-defense areas. Such is the setting for this
thesis, the intent of which is to provide a greater insight into Congres-
sional budgetary behavior for the period FY 1970 through FY 1973 by
analyzing the actions of the House of Representatives Committee on
Appropriations in the area of Defense Procurement.
The approach chosen differs from that of recent studies of Congres-
sional budgetary impact in that the individual decisions of only the
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations for elements within line items are considered rather
than the final aggregated line item recommendations approved by
Congress as a whole. The House Committee on Appropriations was
selected because it is generally recognized as the most influential and
powerful participant of Congress in the budgetary process [Ref. 6,
1
For this study the term "line item" refers to an appropriation
category such as Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy (PAMN).
The term "element" refers to an item included v/ithin a line item such
as the element, S-3A Aircraft, in the line item, PAMN.
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p. 1], The category of Defense Procurement was selected because
it has been the most heavily affected appropriation title for the period
under consideration [Ref. 11]. The study deals only with the request
for new obligational authority (NOA) in the Procurement category.
Budget amendments are included but budget supplementals are not
since the latter are considered by a separate subcommittee and not
the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee whose actions are the




For the Department of Defense, the budget message sent to Con-
gress in January of each year marks the ending of a formal eighteen,
month effort under the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) and the beginning of an equally difficult if not more demanding
challenge -- the Congressional budgetary process. Activity within
Congress includes hearings before the Armed Services Committees of
both houses, passage of an authorization bill in each house followed by
Conference Committee action which resolves differences between the
two bills. In addition, hearings are held before the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations followed by passage of an appropriations
bill by each house and action by a Senate-House Conference to resolve
differences.
While the entire authorization-appropriation process may be
thought of as a sequence of events, it is customary for the Subcommit-
tee on Department of Defense of the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees to hold hearings at approximately the same time as hear-
ings are being held by the Armed Services Committees and usually
2
well before final passage of the Defense Authorization Bill. In fact,
7As an example, for the FY 1972 Defense Budget Request, the
Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings during the period
March 15-May 5, 1971; the House Armed Services Committee held
hearings during the period March 9-May 12; the Senate Defense
i \

a principal cause for late passage of the Defense Appropriations Bill in
recent years has been the lateness of enactment of the authorization
legislation [Ref. 21]. In FY 1970, 1971 and 1972, the Authorization
Conference filed its report on November 6, 1969, October 1, 1970, and
November 5, 1971, respectively. Even greater delays were avoided
because the Defense Subcommittee had already completed its review
and only needed to make the last minute adjustments caused by changes
in the authorization bill. This effort has also been shortened through
cooperation with the Authorizing Committees which have supplied the
results of conference action to the Appropriations Subcommittee on
Defense prior to completion of all conference action [Ref. 18, p. 7].
The process just outlined will be discussed in more detail in this
section and literature on Congressional budgetary behavior will be
reviewed.
A. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY PROCESS
1. The Defense Authorization Bill
An authorization approves functions for which expenditures
are to be made. An appropriation provides the funds for the functions
approved by an authorization [Ref. 14]. Not all of the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee held hearings during the period March 22.
April 27; and the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee held
hearings during the period February 22_June 22. Conference action




Appropriations require annual authorization. Appropriations for
Military Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, and a part of
Procurement are made on the basis of continuing authorizations. Prior
to 1961, Congress had also employed a generalized continuing authoriza.
tion for major procurement by the Armed Services, but a major change
was made by the Russell Amendment of 1959. The Russell Amendment,
incorporated as Section 412(b) of Public Law 86-149, the Military Con-
struction Authorization Act of Fiscal I960, made annual authorization
a requirement for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, or naval
vessels after December 31, I960 [Ref. 3]. Through subsequent amend-
ments, annual authorization of appropriations was extended to include
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) (FY 1963),
Tracked Combat Vehicles (FY 1968), Other Weapons (FY 1970) and
Torpedoes (FY 1971). Approximately 68 per cent of the Defense
request for Procurement in Fiscal 1973 was subject to the annual
authorization requirement [Ref. 1, v. 28, p. 404 and p. 801], Because
of this, the Armed Services Committees which review the authorization
have become a major influence on the Defense appropriations for
Procurement and RDT&E [Refs. 3 and 12].
Although the authorization process may begin in either the
Senate or the House, the House has usually taken the lead. For the
purpose of the following discussion it is assumed that the House ini-
tiated the authorization legislation. Separate hearings on the Defense
11 1 \

Budget are held by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees
during which the request is reviewed with key witnesses from the
Services. An authorization bill is drafted by the House Armed Services
Committee and submitted to the House for passage. Upon approval,
the House bill is sent to the Senate where additional informal hearings
may be held by the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider any
Service reclama to House action. If changes are made in the House
bill, the differences are resolved in joint conference. Following pas-
sage by both houses and signing by the President, the Defense Procure-
ment and RDT&E Authorization Act is delivered to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees, specifically the Subcommittees on Depart-
3
ment of Defense, for use in their review of appropriations requests.
Theoretically, the Authorization Act sets an upper limit on
appropriations, but it is possible for the Appropriations Bill to contain
amounts greater than authorized. Further comment on this matter will
be made in the discussion of the power of the House Committee on
Appropriations.
2. The Defense Appropriation Bill
The sequence of events followed in the appropriations process
parallels that observed in the authorization process. Hearings are
held by the Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense, a report is filed
3 The Military Construction (MILCON) Appropriation is considered
separately by the Military Construction Subcommittees of the Senate
and House Appropriations Committees.
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and legislation is passed by the House and sent to the Senate. In the
Senate, hearings are held by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee
on Defense, a report is filed and legislation is approved by the senior
chamber. To resolve the differences that may exist between the House
and Senate versions of the Appropriations Bill, a conference committee
is convened. The appropriations process ends with final approval of
the Conference Report by both houses and signing by the President.
While the whole process of authorizing and appropriating funds for the
fiscal year commencing on July 1 should be complete by July 1, final
action normally takes place much later. For the period FY 1970 to
FY 1973, earliest enactment of a Defense Appropriations Bill occurred
on October 13, 1972; the latest enactment date for the period was
December 29, 1971.
a. House Action
By tradition, appropriation bills originate in the House of
4
Representatives. The House Appropriations Committee is not only
the first to act but is also generally regarded as being the most in-
fluential and powerful of the Congressional participants [Ref. 6, p. 1],
Because of the relatively large size of the House Committee on
^The Constitution prescribes that revenue bills originate with the
House and is non-specific about appropriations bills. House inter-
pretation and tradition and not constitutional prerogative have estab-
lished the House as the initiator of appropriations bills [Ref. 6, p. 1].
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Appropriations (50) and the rules of assignment which identify it as one
of the three exclusive committees (its members may not serve on any
other House Committee) [Ref. 13], the opportunity for specialization
by the members in their subcommittee assignments is great [Ref. 5],
This has enabled the subcommittee to be extremely thorough in its
review of the budget request.
There are other factors which enhance the Committee's
position of power. All Committee and Subcommittee meetings and
hearings are held behind closed doors in secret executive session.
The only information provided to the whole House comes in the form of
the printed account of the hearings and the Committee Report. Although
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 requires that three calendar
days be allowed from the time the Committee submits its printed report
and hearings record until the time a particular appropriations bill may
be brought to the floor for consideration, judicious use of weekends,
Fridays and Mondays, when many Congressmen are absent from
Washington, can limit opportunity for opposing views to the Committee
recommendations to develop [Ref. 6, p. 48]. Prior to 1965, when
Congressman Clarence Cannon was Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, a Friday-Tuesday sequence was consistently scheduled,
i. e. , the Committee would file its report on Friday and bring the bill
up in the House on Monday. Since 1965, when Congressman George
Mahon assumed the Chairmanship, a Thursday-Tuesday schedule has
14 1

become common, Under Congressman Mahon, bills have normally
been reported out on Thursday and taken up in the House on the follow-
ing Tuesday. The ability to control the movement of appropriations
bills to the House floor is based on House rules which designate the
reports of the Appropriations Committee as privileged matters. A
special rule from the Rules Committee is not required to gain clearance
to the House floor. In addition, the reports have precedence over most
other business [Ref. 6, p. 417].
The House Committee on Appropriations is expected to
appropriate and not legislate. The authorization legislation should
therefore set the upper limit on funds the Committee may appropriate.
While this is generally the case, there have been instances when the
Committee has recommended and had approved an appropriation greater
than was authorized. Establishing an appropriation in excess of the
authorization limit is considered a form of legislating. Any provision
that is of the nature of legislation will survive if unopposed but it may
be struck from the bill if any House member makes a point of order
against it. It is possible for the Committee to avoid such defeat by
asking for and being granted by the House Rules Committee a special
rule to waive all points of order against its bill. According to Fenno
this procedure has been used sparingly [Ref. 6, p. 422].
Some indication of the power and influence of the Appro-
priations Committee can be seen in the success its recommendations
15 *

have had in withstanding amendment. In his study of the House Appro-
priations Committee activity in non-defense areas, Fenno reported
that, of 547 proposed amendments over a 16 year period, only 163 or
30 per cent passed. The record for defense appropriations is even
more impressive. In the period from FY 1958 through FY 1973, of a
total of 85 floor amendments proposed, only 15 or 18 per cent were
accepted. In the area of Defense Procurement over the same 16 year
period (FY 1958-1973), only 34 amendments were offered with five or
15 per cent being approved. From FY 1969 through FY 1973, 16 amend-
ments were offered in the area of procurement but none were adopted.
Upon passage by the whole House, the Appropriations
Bill is sent to the Senate for consideration.
b. Senate Action
The role of the Senate Committee on Appropriations has
been characterized as being a responsible Court of Appeals while the
House Committee has enjoyed the reputation of being guardian of the
Treasury [Ref. 10]. In its review of the House Appropriation Bill the
Senate Appropriations Committee has generally considered the appeals
of agencies seeking restoration of reductions made by the House. In
recent years, the Senate Committee has begun to rival the House in
making reductions in the budget request. According to Arnold Kanter,
the Senate, since FY 1967, has been taking a more critical look at
defense expenditures and by FY 1969 was voting smaller appropriations
than the House for most line items [Ref. 10].
16 (

The result of Senate action is an appropriation bill that
usually differs from the House version. Resolution of the differences
is handled by the Conference Committee. The appropriations process
ends with approval of the Conference Report by both houses and signing
by the President.
B. BUDGETING LITERATURE
There have been numerous studies dealing with Congressional
budgetary activity and behavior. Two principal works generally regarded
as authoritative references are The Politics of the Budgetary Process by
Aaron Wildavsky [Ref. 21] and The Power of the Purse by Richard Fenno .
[Ref. 6]. Both are comprehensive in their descriptions of Congressional
budgetary activity and provide insight into the composition, power and
influence of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. The
studies are based on personal observation and numerous interviews of
agency officials and members of Congress closely associated with the
appropriations process. Consideration is limited to non-defense areas.
There is agreement between Fenno and Wildavsky that Congress makes
budget decisions on an incremental basis.
In the article, A Theory of the Budgetary Process, the team of
Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky proposed several models as possible
decision rules for the development of agency budget requests and Con-
gressional consideration of agency requests. The budget requests for
56 non-defense agencies for the period, 1947 to 1963, v/ere studied in
17

conjunction with the final Congressional appropriations. The empirical
results were said to support the hypothesis that "the budgetary process
of the United States Government is equivalent to a set of temporally
stable linear decision rules" [Ref. 2],
Whereas Fenno and Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky supported the
notion that the Congressional budgetary process has been based on
incrementalism and has been non-programmatic, Arnold Kanter has
claimed that most Congressional decisions in the area of defense have
been based on judgements relating weapon systems to Congressional
perception of the nation's defense requirements. In his article, Congress
and the Defense Budget: 1960-1970
,
Kanter looked at 2 8 individual line
items included within four appropriation titles, i.e., Personnel, Opera-
tions and Maintenance (O&M), Procurement, and Research, Develop-
ment, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E). The study used data for the
period, FY I960 through 1970. In addition to the conclusion that budget-
ing had a programmatic orientation, Kanter also identified the categories
of Procurement and RDT&E as receiving the greatest attention by
Congress [Ref. 10].
Lawrence Korb in Congressional Impact on Defense Spending,
1962-1973: The Programmatic and Fiscal Hypotheses attempted to
resolve the different perceptions of Congressional impact upon the
Defense Budget. His conclusion, unlike Kanter's was that Congres-
sional motivations were mostly fiscal, i. e.
,
concerned with the level
18 (

of spending and not primarily programmatic. According to Korb,
Congress almost never cancels a weapon system outright and usually
makes reductions by delaying or stretching out programs [Ref. 11].
Joseph Terry in his thesis entitled, A Methodology for Analyzing
Congressional Behavior Toward Department of Defense Budget Requests
,
developed and empirically tested four simple linear models to relate
Congressional appropriations to the Defense Budget request in the
tradition of the modeling of Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky. Based on
the empirical results, Terry concluded that at least part of the complex
Defense budgetary process could be explained by simple mathematical
models [Ref. 15].
In Information Change and Congressional Behavior: A Caveat for
PPB Reformers, James Jernberg looked at the published record of the
hearings of the House Appropriations Committee and used the technique
of "content analysis" to classify the budgetary orientation of three sub-
committees. The classification was based on the types of questions the
subcommittees asked agency officials during the hearings and not on
the final dollars appropriated [Ref. 9]«
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a greater insight into
Congressional budgetary behavior. This is accomplished by using a
technique similar to "content analysis" employed by Jernberg to identify
the nature of the decision making behavior of one of the principal Con-
gressional participants, the House Defense Appropriations Subcommit-
tee. The study, which is limited to Defense Procurement, involved
19 j

a detailed review of the content of the official records of Subcommittee
activity. The reasons given in the reports for the recommendations of
the Subcommittee are identified and cataloged so as to isolate true
Subcommittee initiative. Analysis of such Subcommittee activity in
relation to the unresolved programmatic versus fiscal issue appears
to show greater support for a fiscal orientation as being descriptive of
the behavior of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in the
area of Defense Procurement.
20 I >

III. METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
At the outset, it was decided to attempt to characterize the activity
of the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the House Appropria-
tions Committee on the basis of the reasons given for its decisions on
the individual line item elements of the Defense Department Procure-
ment Appropriation. At the time of analysis in FY 1974, there were
i
13 line items in the Procurement Appropriation, i. e. , Aircraft Procure-
ment, Army; Missile Procurement, Army; Procurement of Ammunition,
©
Army; Other Procurement, Army; Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles,
Navy (PAMN); Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN); Other Procure-
D
ment, Navy (OPN); Procurement, Marine Corps (PMC); Aircraft
Procurement, Air Force (APAF); Missile Procurement, Air Force
(MPAF); Other Procurement, Air Force (OPAF); and, Procurement,
Defense Agencies. Procurement for Defense Agencies represented
less than 0. 5 per cent of the total budget request and was not included
in this analysis. Prior to FY 1972, the five line items for the Army
were included in one major line item. Procurement of Equipment
and Missiles, (PEMA). For ease of comparison, the five Army line
items of the FY 1972 and FY 1973 budgets were combined and treated
as a single equivalent PEMA line item in this analysis.
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The published records and accounts of House appropriations activity-
were studied and the justifications given for particular actions were
identified and assigned to one of seven categories of reasons. By-
analyzing the distribution of" types of decisions, it was expected that
Subcommittee behavioral tendencies would be identified. Through this
process it was hoped that clarification of the programmatic versus
fiscal controversy would be possible.
B. DATA SOURCES
The primary references used for this study were the published
Reports of the House Appropriations Committee for the Department of
Defense Appropriation Bill for FY 1970 through FY 1973 [Ref. 16, 17,
18, and 19]. The necessary supplemental references included the
printed Hearings of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Depart-
ment of Defense [Ref. 4], the Congressional Quarterly Almanac [Ref. 1]
and the Committee Print Table of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services for FY 1970, 1971 and 1973 [Ref. 20]. The Committee Print
Table is a summary of the results of Congressional activity on Procure-
ment and RDT&tE items requiring annual authorization authority. It is
prepared by the Senate Armed Services Committee Staff for use by the
Committee in its review of the budget request for the next fiscal year.
The table provides a quick view of what cuts were made. Included in
the Print Table are detailed summaries by type of weapon system and
Service, e.g., Army Aircraft, Navy Missiles, Naval Vessels, etc.
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In general, there was little in the way of specific testimony or
Subcommittee member comment in the Hearings to suggest the action
later recommended in the Report . Indications as to the size of the
specific adjustments contemplated by the Subcommittee could not be
determined from the Hearings . The printed record of the hearings
did prove of considerable value in providing the specific details of the
line item and element requests. This information was usually found
in the prepared opening statements of Service officials. There were
instances when it was difficult to reconcile the reductions cited in the
Committee Report with those shown in the Committee Print Tables .
While total amounts, such as for Navy Aircraft Procurement, were
accurate, assignment of reductions in Committee reports to elements
like "F-14 Aircraft" and "Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts" some-
times differed between the Committee Print Table and the Committee
Report . By referring to the Service request outlined in the Hearings
the matter could often be resolved.
Analysis of the Defense Procurement appropriation for FY 1972
was particularly difficult since a Committee Print Table was unobtain-
able. The Committee Print Table had its limitation in that it could
only be used to verify those elements of the budget request which
required annual authorization authority. This study considered the





C. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
1. Impact of Authorization Legislation
Each of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
decisions was assigned to one of seven categories on the basis of the
reasons cited in the Committee Report for the action taken. The
budget adjustments resulting from the authorization legislation which
were accepted by the House Subcommittee without modification were
identified as a separate category. The intent was to identify those
decisions on which the House Subcommittee merely conformed and took
no new initiative. In the process it was possible to assess the influence
of the Authorization Act on the development of the Procurement appro-
priation. Table I is an accounting of the authorization-appropriation
relationships. It is clear that the Armed Services Committees do
have the opportunity to greatly affect the appropriations process.
Approximately 70 per cent of the Defense Procurement appropriation
is subject to annual Congressional authorization. For the period,
FY 1970- 1973, of the segment of the Defense Procurement Appropria-
tion requiring annual authorization, Congress made budget cuts
averaging six per cent a year. However, it was only in FY 1973 that
5
the reduction exceeded the Fenno five per cent criteria of significance.
When related to the decisions of the House Subcommittee, the
5 Fenno has claimed that changes of less than five per cent are
marginal [Ref. 6, p. 353].
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adjustments prescribed in the authorizing legislation are shown to have
had a growing influence. In FY 1970, only 11.7 per cent of the total
dollar reductions recommended by the House Subcommittee were attrib-
utable to the authorization process as seen in Table I. The impact has
grown dramatically in each successive year. By FY 1973, 73 per cent
of the total dollar reductions recommended by the House Subcommittee
were traceable to the authorization process. This growing impact of
the authorization process suggests that, at least for the Defense Procure-
ment appropriation, the Armed Services Committees of Congress have a
significant if not dominant influence.
2. Decision Categories
For the period, FY 1970-1973, reports of the House Committee
on Appropriations contained a total of 313 proposed actions affecting the
Defense Procurement Appropriation. Using the reasons cited in the
reports, the decisions were divided into seven categories; "improper
requests", "reduced requirements", "Service adjustments", "financial
adjustment", "special Subcommittee action", "no reason cited", and
"conformance with authorization". The type of reasons included in
each category are detailed below.
a. Improper Request
The reasons in this category fall into four major groupings.
(1) Improper Category . Procurement funding was re-
quested for an effort whose nature was more appropriately funded under
some other appropriation such as RDT&E or O&M.
25 t \

(2) Premature Request. Testing was incomplete; defi-
ciencies had not been corrected; a slowdown was needed to permit full
evaluation; the request would result in excessive concurrency between
development and procurement.
(3) Reductions Due to Cuts in Related Programs . Reduc-
tions were a natural consequence of other decisions.
(4) Insufficient Priority/Urgency . The purpose of the
program could not justify the cost, or items were made a part of a
budget amendment but were of insufficient urgency to warrant amend-
ment action.
b. Service Adjustment
During the hearings, the Services identified areas of
reduced funding requirements resulting from actions which they had
already initiated, e. g. , cancellation of requirements, termination of
contracts, deferral of procurement, program realignment, awarding
of multi-year contracts, and use of current assets in place of new
procurement. The Subcommittee merely endorsed these Service
identified reductions.
c. Reduced Requirement
Reductions were possible because of differences between
current actual usage and attrition rates and those used by the Services
in forecasting requirements during budget preparation. These dif-
ferences were identified by the House Subcommittee and were not




Reductions were recommended by the Subcommittee but
were immediately offset by the transfer of prior year unobligated funds
or the transfer of funds from the Defense or Service Stock Funds.
e. Special Subcommittee Action
The reasons in this category fall into two major areas.
(1) General Reduction . The Subcommittee imposed
reductions of a non-specific nature which were to be absorbed as the
affected Service saw fit.
(2) Reversal of Authorization Decisions . These decisions
resulted in nullifying the addition or deletion of funding approved during
the authorization process and appropriating just what had been requested
by the Services.
f. No Reason Cited
Reductions in classified projects and for certain other
items were identified by amount only. Specific reasons were not given.
g. Conformance with Authorization
The Subcommittee concurred in the adjustment prescribed
in the authorization legislation. Authorization actions which were
further modified by the House Subcommittee are included in the other
categories.
Table II provides the distribution of actions taken. As indicated,
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request", with over 37 per cent of the total actions recommended for the
period, FY 1970-1973.
The decisions included in the categories "reduced requirements",
"Service adjustment", "conformance with authorization" and "financial
adjustment" did not appear to represent true Subcommittee initiative.
The decisions in these four categories had little, if any, impact on the
budget request, were the results of action initiated by the Services, were
based on actions initiated in the authorization process or were the nat-
ural reactions to changed usage or attrition rates.
Decisions in the "conformance with authorization" category
represented endorsement of the authorization action without change by
the House Subcommittee on Defense appropriations.
"Service adjustment" decisions merely represented Subcom-
mittee endorsement of budget changes initiated or proposed by the Ser-
vices after the budget had been submitted to Congress. For example,
for the FY 1973 budget request, the Marine Corps witnesses testified
that the $7.7 million requested for procurement of LVTE-7 assault
amphibian mine clearance vehicle, initial spares and contractor support
would not be needed since the Marine Corps had cancelled the require-
ment. The Subcommittee therefore recommended a reduction of $7. 7
million in the budget request for tracked combat vehicles.
In "reduced requirements" decisions the Subcommittee reacted
to differences between current actual usage and/attrition rates and
29 I

those used by the Services in forecasting requirements during budget
preparation. As an example, for FY 1970, the Subcommittee recom-
mended a reduction of $92. 8 million in ammunition based primarily on
reduced ammunition consumption possibly due to a decrease in combat
operations in Southeast Asia although not specifically stated.
The decisions in the category, "financial adjustment", while
credited to the Subcommittee as reductions were little more than book-
keeping exercises. The Subcommittee would make a reduction and then
immediately recommend that it be offset with the transfer of unobligated
funds of prior years whose period for obligation was about to expire.
As an example, for FY 1973, the Subcommittee recommended a financial
adjustment reduction in PAMN of $25 million but provided transfer
authority for the Navy to utilize $25 million from the account, PAMN,
1971/1973, to offset the recommended reduction. Such maneuvering
had little effect on the individual elements of the budget request. This
maneuvering is best explained when one realizes that, prior to 1971,
appropriations were "no year" appropriations with no time limit for
the obligation of appropriated funds. In order to provide Congress
with an additional measure of control over Defense funding, a provision
was incorporated as part of the Defense Appropriation Act for 1971
which established periods of obligation for appropriated funds. The
The periods of obligation represented a control for Congress as a
whole. Congressional Committees involved with defense funding already
exercised a limited degree of control through the reprogramming process.
[Ref. 18, p. 8 and Ref. 8, p. 192].
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"no year" appropriations were thus changed to multi-year accounts.
The obligational periods established were three years for all Procure-
ment line items except Shipbuilding, which was allowed five years, two
years for RDT&E and one year for Military Personnel and Operations
and Maintenance. The assigned times approximated the average spend-
out periods for the respective appropriations [Ref. 17, p. 8]. As in-
dicated in Table II, there was a marked increase in the use of "financial
adjustments" by the Subcommittee in FY 1972 and FY 1973. This may
have been a result of the no-year to multi-year change in appropriations.
If one were to consider the decisions of the four categories,
"reduced requirements", "Service adjustment", "conformance with
authorization" and "financial adjustment" as not representing true
Subcommittee initiative, and being unable to study the "no reason cited"
category for lack of clarifying information in the data sources, it is
clear that further analysis should focus on the two remaining categories,
"improper request" and "special Subcommittee action. "
3. The "Real" Decisions of the Subcommittee
The two categories, "improper request" and "special Sub-
committee action", include decisions which appear to represent original
independent action of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Department of
Defense and would be expected to be most indicative of Subcommittee
interest and behavior. Together the two categories accounted for 49. 5
per cent of all the decisions and 39 per cent of the total dollar reduction
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recommended for the period, FY 1970-1973. Again, it should be noted
that included in these two categories are some reductions which were
initially made in the authorization process but were further modified by
the House Subcommittee.
a. Improper Request Category
The "improper request" category was the most heavily
populated of all seven original categories with 115 decisions or 36.7
per cent of all decisions for the period, FY 1970-1973. It was also the
category which accounted for the greatest dollar reduction, i. e.
,
$2709. 7
million or approximately 33 per cent of the total amount. A breakdown
of the category by classes of decisions is provided in Table III. As the
data indicates, the Subcommittee focused its greatest attention on the
class, "premature request". These decisions reflected Subcommittee
interest in program progress. Requests were considered to be pre-
mature if all, or almost all, aspects of program development had not
been completed. The Subcommittee was alert to slippages in schedule,
testing results and system performance and evaluation. For example,
in FY 1973, the Subcommittee was not convinced that the AIM-7F
Sparrow Missile tests had demonstrated that the missile was ready to
enter production and, therefore denied the Air Force request for $19. 5
million. In such instances, the size of the funding request appeared
to be secondary to the desire to avoid excessive concurrency between
















































































































































































































































were made each year in response to items in the "premature request"
category than any other category, an average of 13 decisions per year
for the period, FY 1970-1973.
Another large class of decisions is the one which includes
reductions forced by actions taken in related items. There were 25
such decisions representing almost 22 per cent of the 115 decisions in
the "improper request" category for the period. The resultant reduc-
tions were generally in the area of spares and repair parts and were
caused by decisions of the "premature request" type. For example,
for FY 1970, the Subcommittee reduced the Navy request for missile
spares and repair parts by $2.4 million based on cuts recommended in
missile procurement. Since such decisions were the natural con-
sequences of other related decisions they may be considered to be non-
representative of true Subcommittee initiative and therefore of little use
in describing Subcommittee behavior. Eliminating this class of decisions
from further consideration narrowed the field and re-emphasized the
importance of the "premature request" class of decisions in explaining
Subcommittee budgetary behavior.
Consideration of the category, "improper request", in
terms of the individual line item appropriations, identified the Navy
as the Service most affected by House Subcommittee action both from
the standpoint of numbers of decisions and dollar reductions. The
Marine Corps was the least affected Service, while the Army and
34

Air Force shared second place honors. The Army had more decisions
(41) but fewer dollars ($465. 3 million) cut from its budget request than
did the Air Force (27 decisions and $698. 8 million). Table IV is a
breakdown of the "improper request" category by line item appropriation
In Table V, the Services are listed in order of Subcommittee impact.
b. Special Subcommittee Action
The types of decisions included in the category, "special
Subcommittee action", are listed in Table VI. The 40 actions in this
category represented 12.8 per cent of the 313 total decisions for the
period and accounted for $488. 8 million or 5. 9 per cent of the total
dollar reduction. Actions were concentrated in two areas, those which
reversed authorization action and others which made general reductions.
The result of the Subcommittee reversal actions was to leave intact the
original budget request for certain line item elements. Of 15 reversal
actions, nine removed authorized additions and six restored amounts
disallowed during the authorization process. The elimination of "add-
on's" was within the normally accepted behavior of the Subcommittee,
but restoration of cuts represented an incursion by the Subcommittee
into the area of legislating, traditionally the domain of the Armed
Services Committees. Authorization Committees legislate and
Appropriations Committees are expected to appropriate funds within
the limits set by the Authorization Act. The success enjoyed by the
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floor suggests the existence of a flexible limit to Subcommittee power
and influence [Ref. 6, p. 422].
The class of decisions, "general reduction", contain those
actions which might indicate a fiscal orientation toward budgeting. Korb
has suggested that a fiscal orientation would be reflected in attention
being focused on eliminating waste and inefficiency and that one of the
results would be across the board reductions [Ref. 11]. For example,
for FY 1970, the Subcommittee recommended a general reduction of
$34.4 million in the PEMA appropriation, over and above the specific
reductions for various procurement items, to be applied by the Secretary
of Defense against those items he deemed appropriate [Ref. 16, p. 54].
For the period, FY 1970-1973, there were 13 decisions of this type rep-
resenting approximately four per cent of all decisions and 3. 8 per cent
of the total dollar reduction.
As in the case of the "improper request" category, the
decisions under the "special Subcommittee action" category were also
considered in terms of the individual line item appropriations, e. g. ,
PEMA, PAMN, etc. Table VII provides the breakdown. Again, the Navy
was the most affected Service with 25 decisions providing a reduction of
$322. 9 million. The Army and Air Force shared runner-up honors
with more decisions falling to the Air Force and greater dollar reduc-
tions assigned to the Army. Table VIII indicates the impact of Sub-
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D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The analysis undertaken in this thesis was limited to consideration
of the actions of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on the
Defense Procurement appropriation. Three significant aspects of Sub-
committee activity have been identified which contribute to a greater
insight into Congressional budgetary behavior. First, the authorization
process has been shown to have had an increasing impact on the Procure-
ment appropriation. In FY 1973, approximately 73 per cent of the total
dollar reduction recommended by the House Subcommittee on Defense
for the Procurement appropriation could be attributed to cuts imposed by
the Armed Services Committees during the authorization process.
Second, the study has suggested that the decisions that are indicative
of true Subcommittee initiative represent less than 40 per cent of all
Subcommittee recommendations and that such activity can be grouped
into two principal categories identified as "improper requests" and
"special Subcommittee action". Within the larger category, "improper
requests", Subcommittee activity was concentrated in two areas labeled
"premature requests" and "improper category requests". "Premature
request" decisions were those which were generally concerned with
program progress and the avoidance of excessive concurrency between
development and procurement. The "improper category requests"
identified activities which were more appropriately funded under an
appropriation other than Procurement, such as RDT&E or O&M.
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Within the smaller category, "special Subcommittee action", there
were also two principal areas of attention referred to as "general reduc-
tions" and "reversal of authorization decisions". "General reductions"
represented cuts generally of a non-specific nature which were to be
absorbed as the affected Service saw fit. In "reversal of authorization
decisions" some indication of House Subcommittee independence and
influence was provided. The House Subcommittee was able to success-
fully restore cuts and thereby exceed the theoretical upper bound on
funding authority set by the authorization legislation.
The third finding involved the identification of the Navy as the
Service most affected in the Defense Procurement appropriation by the
House Subcommittee, both in number of decisions and the dollar amount
of reduction for the period, FY 1970-1973. Runner-up honors were




A. IMPACT ON DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
The greatest impact of Congressional budgetary activity on the
Defense request has been in the area of Procurement where the reduc-
tions enacted by Congress for the period, FY 1970-1973, have averaged
approximately 12 per cent of the amount requested [Ref. 11]. The pur-
pose of this study was to provide a greater insight into the Congressional
budgetary process by analyzing the actions of the House Defense Appro-
priations Subcommittee in the area of Defense Procurement. The House
Subcommittee has played a central role in the appropriations process
and in the area of Procurement has enjoyed amendment-free endorse-
ment of its recommendations by the House for the four years included
in this study.
This analysis has indicated that there was an increasing impact by
the authorization process on the Defense Procurement appropriation for
the period studied; that in FY 1973 approximately 73 per cent of the total
dollar reduction in Procurement could be attributed to cuts made in the
authorization legislation; that the House Subcommittee exercised true
initiative in less than 40 per cent of its recommendations concerning
Defense Procurement; that Subcommittee activity was usually concerned
with program progress, elimination of improper funding, or critical
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review of items added or eliminated during the authorization process;
that general arbitrary reductions, while employed by the Subcommittee,
were used sparingly; and that the Navy was the Service most heavily
affected by the Subcommittee actions in the area of Defense Procurement.
B. BUDGETARY ORIENTATION: PROGRAMMATIC OR FISCAL?
If a programmatic orientation in budgetary activity means that
budget decisions are made after consideration of overall national policy
choices and national security objectives, as suggested by Arnold Kanter,
then the normal behavior of the House Defense Appropriations Subcom-
mittee must be considered non-programmatic with regard to Defense
Procurement. The thrust of Subcommittee attention during the period,
FY 1970- 1973, was in the direction of program progress and costs.
If a programmatic orientation is reflected in program cancellations,
as indicated by Korb, then House Subcommittee behavior is a matter of
interpretation. There were programs cancelled or eliminated during
the period, FY 1970-1973, including the Cheyenne helicopter, the fast
deployment logistics ship (FDL) and the Main Battle Tank (MBT), but all
such cancellations or program eliminations were effected during the
authorization process. Although the House Subcommittee did not initiate
the action, its endorsement of the action might be interpreted as indica-
tive of programmatic behavior.
If a fiscal orientation is indicated by across the board reductions,
as implied by Kanter, then House Subcommittee behavior is fiscal, at
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least in part. General reductions represented some $314.9 million or
3.8 per cent of the total period reduction of $8196.4 million recommended
by the House Subcommittee.
If a fiscal orientation is characterized by program slowdown or
stretch-out, as suggested by Korb, then House Subcommittee behavior
is largely fiscal. The largest single class of decisions involved program
progress and generally had the effect of slowing down programs to pre-
clude excessive concurrency.
In general, the House Subcommittee identified specific reductions
with specific requests and based its decisions on the specific cost details
provided by the Services. With few exceptions, the actions taken by the
Subcommittee could not be viewed as arbitrary. The Subcommittee
behavior does not appear to be as systemitized as suggested by Davis,
Dempster and Wildavsky and Terry. Therefore, the applicability of
the mathematical models of Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky and Terry
is considered doubtful at the program level of aggregation of budgetary
decisions by the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
Although the results of this study are not conclusive and only apply
to the area of the Defense Procurement Appropriation, they do indicate
greater support for a fiscal orientation in the budgetary behavior of
the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, if a fiscal orientation
means concern for the level of spending with across the board cuts
and/or slowdown of programs.
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The area of RDT&E has been second only to Procurement with
regard to Congressional budgetary activity and would be a logical area
for a follow-on study of House Subcommittee behavior. Similar analyses
of the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations in the areas of
Procurement and RDT&E would provide the basis for the comparison
and assessment of the relative importance and influence of the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees over the Defense Appropriation.
Because of the growing influence of the authorization process on
the appropriations results, it appears that an analysis of the behavior
of the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate is needed in
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